So getting back to your question: maybe Richard can name off some, but I would suggest you look for yourself. I do not know your access to papers behind academic paywalls. This is particular papers regarding all kinds of responses to Dennett and what he misses. I am sure that many of them have the same issue with Dennett that Richard does. I think the pattern will be clear. Forgot to say: you might want to key on the following sections on Dennett: 1.
Note also that many papers are people agreeing with Dennett as well. Good, now this seems a much more productive discussion. We have ideas vs an assumption that ideas are somehow attached to an individual, which seems a separate question. As a rhetorical convention it seems innocent but is perhaps not. Magical, imaginary? I do not see your response as productive.
You seem to be asking for a theory of: meaning, reference, explanation, and theories while seemingly assuming beliefs around those yourself which are also undefended.
I do not have the time nor the inclination to respond. Which theories are non physical or rather non materialist theories? Idealism and modern dualism comes to mind off hand. You declare just like dennett that if something is undefinable its not worth discussing which is of course would be very convenient for you and dennett if it were true.
This is a good analysis. I have literally never seen this much goalpost-moving, hand-waving, and blatant denial of reality from one writer to the point where I have a hard time interpreting his arguments in good faith. You are commenting using your WordPress. You are commenting using your Google account. You are commenting using your Twitter account. You are commenting using your Facebook account. Notify me of new comments via email. Notify me of new posts via email.
He says, The problem with Dualism, ever since Descartes, is that nobody has ever been able to offer a convincing account of how these postulated interactive transactions between mind and body could occur without violating the laws of physics.
Just to make the supposition as clear as possible, here is a somewhat expanded version of the purported explanation of the red afterimage effect: Fixating on the real green stripes in front of you for a few seconds fatigues the relevant neural circuits in the complementary color system, which then generate a false signal red, not green , which does not get disconfirmed so long as the fatigue lasts, so somewhere fairly high in the process betwixt retina and, um … the philosophical conviction center, a red stripe-shaped quale is rendered, and it is the appreciation of this quale that grounds, fuels, informs, causes, underwrites the philosophical conviction that right now you are enjoying a stripe-shaped red quale.
Like this: Like Loading What are the main texts that Dennett is ignoring from the past 10 years or so? Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:. Email required Address never made public.
Name required. Follow Following. Richard Brown Join 3, other followers. Sign me up. Already have a WordPress. Log in now. Post was not sent - check your email addresses! Knill eds. American Psychological Association. Filling in Gaps in Perception: Part I. Vilayanur S. Ramachandran - - Current Directions in Psychological Science Gregory - - Nature Representations, Computation, and Inverse Ecological Optics.
Heiko Neumann - - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 6 Ramachandran - - Consciousness and Cognition 2 2 Ikuya Murakami - - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 6 Frank H. Durgin - - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 6 O'Regan - - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 6 Filling-in as the Phenomenal Side of Binding.
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Sign in to use this feature. About us. Um, what? How is Daniel Dennett—one of the best philosophers of our time, capable of making such an obvious mistake?
This is logically blasphemous. The randomness of the light was a distraction, not a solution. Next, Dennett attacks the concept of the replay of the past as a thought experiment for the lack of free will:.
Everyday folks think Bigfoot is real. Everyday folks are waiting for Jesus to return. Yes, you can go 40 MPH, or 60 MPH, or swerve to avoid the pedestrian, or swerve to hit him—but either way there is a cause for that outcome. Taking input and formulating a complex response is not freedom. Plants do it.
Animals do it. Computers do it. Actually, it does get more real than that. How about something being true whether or not someone is experiencing it? People see ghosts. People hear voices. And we have rules for differentiating them. So just pointing to the fact that something is being experienced is most definitely not enough.
Not even close. Again, he just described many different types of decision-maker. Computers do this. Apes do this. Dogs do this. Fish do this. The more a word means the less it means.
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